In 1997 Michael O'Dell, the chief scientist at World-Com, which owned the largest network of “Internet backbone” fiber optic cable in the world, stated that data traffic over the Internet was doubling every hundred days. This implied a growth rate of over 1,000 percent a year. O'Dell went on to day that there was not enough fiber optic capacity to go around, and that “demand will far outstrip supply for the foreseeable future.”
Electrified by this potential opportunity, a number of companies rushed into the business. These firms included Level 3 Communications, 360 Networks, Global Crossing, Qwest Communications, World-Com, Williams Communications Group, Genuity Inc., and XO Communications. In all cases the strategic plans were remarkably similar: Raise lots of capital, build massive fiber optic networks that straddled the nation (or even the globe), cut prices, and get ready for the rush of business. Managers at these companies believed that surging demand would soon catch up with capacity, resulting in a profit bonanza for those that had the foresight to build out their networks. It was a gold rush, and the first into the field would stake the best claims.
However, there were dissenting voices. As early as October 1998 an Internet researcher at AT&T Labs named Andrew Odlyzko published a paper that de-bunked the assumption that demand for Internet traffic was growing at 1,000 percent a year. Odlyzko’s careful analysis concluded that growth was much slower—only 100 percent a year! Although still large, that growth rate was not nearly large enough to fill the massive flood of fiber optic capacity that was entering the market. Moreover, Odlyzko noted that new technologies were increasing the amount of data that could be sent down existing fibers, reducing the need for new fiber. But with investment money flooding into the market, few paid any attention to him. WorldCom was still using the 1,000 percent figure as late as September 2000.
As it turned out, Odlyzko was right. Capacity rapidly outstripped demand, and by late 2002 less than 3 percent of the fiber that had been laid in the ground was actually being used! While prices slumped, the surge in volume that managers had bet on did not materialize. Unable to service the debt they had taken on to build out their networks, company after company tumbled into bankruptcy—including WorldCom, 360 Networks, XO Communications, Global Crossing. Level 3 and Qwest survived, but their stock price had fallen by 90 percent, and both companies were saddled with massive debts.
Electrified by this potential opportunity, a number of companies rushed into the business. These firms included Level 3 Communications, 360 Networks, Global Crossing, Qwest Communications, World-Com, Williams Communications Group, Genuity Inc., and XO Communications. In all cases the strategic plans were remarkably similar: Raise lots of capital, build massive fiber optic networks that straddled the nation (or even the globe), cut prices, and get ready for the rush of business. Managers at these companies believed that surging demand would soon catch up with capacity, resulting in a profit bonanza for those that had the foresight to build out their networks. It was a gold rush, and the first into the field would stake the best claims.
However, there were dissenting voices. As early as October 1998 an Internet researcher at AT&T Labs named Andrew Odlyzko published a paper that de-bunked the assumption that demand for Internet traffic was growing at 1,000 percent a year. Odlyzko’s careful analysis concluded that growth was much slower—only 100 percent a year! Although still large, that growth rate was not nearly large enough to fill the massive flood of fiber optic capacity that was entering the market. Moreover, Odlyzko noted that new technologies were increasing the amount of data that could be sent down existing fibers, reducing the need for new fiber. But with investment money flooding into the market, few paid any attention to him. WorldCom was still using the 1,000 percent figure as late as September 2000.
As it turned out, Odlyzko was right. Capacity rapidly outstripped demand, and by late 2002 less than 3 percent of the fiber that had been laid in the ground was actually being used! While prices slumped, the surge in volume that managers had bet on did not materialize. Unable to service the debt they had taken on to build out their networks, company after company tumbled into bankruptcy—including WorldCom, 360 Networks, XO Communications, Global Crossing. Level 3 and Qwest survived, but their stock price had fallen by 90 percent, and both companies were saddled with massive debts.
Q1. Why did the strategic plans adopted by companies like level 3, Global crossing, and 360 Network fail?
Ans.: The Strategic plans adopted by companies like level 3, Global Crossing, and 360 Networks fails due to the huge capital investment by various companies in a similar sector, with cutting price rate, that too nationally and globally rushing towards the business. The strategic plans failed due to the wrong market analysis and heavy competition between similar investors in an off-beam approach.
Q2. The managers who ran these companies were smart, successful individuals, as were many of the investors who put money into their businesses. How could so many smart people have been so wrong?
Ans.: Managers in this companies are very smart, talent and successful individuals; however they believed and having forethought that surging demand would create more profit and advance in creating business. For them, it was just like a rush to grab and collect gold openly without putting any high effort. The managers of these companies are very sticky and not aware of any new invention and marketing strategies, due to which they lost and failed.
Q3. What specific decision-making biases do you think were at work in this industry during the late 1990s and early 2000s?
Ans.: Less structured and inflexible occurrences in these companies, specifies about non-programmed decision making conception were seen in the industries during the late 1990s and early 2000s which led to bankruptcy and saddled with massive debts.
Q4. What could the managers running these companies done differently that might have led to a different outcome?
Ans.: The market analysis and decision making was very poor among the managers, which led to this condition of the companies. Other than this, the forecast given by Andrew Odlyzko of AT&T Lab was totally ignored and not even inspected or analyzed, just rushed as fired in dark without any assumption.
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